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Abstract This article advances the concept of “time–space intensification” as an
alternative to existing notions of time–space distanciation, compression and embedding
that attempt to capture the restructuring of time and space in contemporary advanced
capitalism. This concept suggests time and space are intensified in the contemporary period –
the social experience of time and space becomes more explicit and more crucial to socio-
economic actors’ lives, time and space are mobilized more explicitly in individual and
corporate action, and the institutionalization of time and space becomes more politicized.
Drawing on Polanyi’s concepts of fictitious commodities and the double movement, and
developing them through an analysis of work organization and economic development in
the Irish software industry, the article argues that the concept of time–space intensification
can add significantly to our understanding of key features of the restructuring of the
temporal and spatial basis of economic development and work organization.
Time, space, and global informational capitalism
Having long defined the contemporary socio-economic advanced capitalist order in relation
to what it is not – Post-Industrial, Post-Fordist, Post-Modern – theorists are increasingly
attempting to define the contemporary era in terms of its own central features. One of the
most influential among these formulations are those which emphasize the shift from an
economy based on the manufacturing of industrial goods by production workers to one
based on the design of informational goods and services by knowledge workers (Castells,
1997; Freeman & Louca, 2002; Jessop, 2000; Reich, 1991). This informational form of
capitalism is also linked to socio-spatial change and particularly the rise of a global
economy, spanning local and national borders and apparently operating on a planetary scale
(Castells, 1997; Giddens, 1991; Reich, 1991). This global informational capitalism is also
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characterized by new organizational forms, typically captured under the loose rubric of
“network” forms of organization (Freeman & Louca, 2002).
Techno-economic, socio-spatial, and organizational changes have combined to transform
economic life therefore. But the effects go further to, arguably, transform the temporal and
spatial basis of economic and social life itself. For some, the contemporary era is
characterized by the “death of distance” and new virtual social spaces; for others, these
spaces are increasingly controlled by capitalists, while for yet others local and regional
spaces have re-emerged as crucial spaces within the global economy. This article explores
this contested terrain of the temporal and spatial restructuring of global informational
capitalism and advances the concept of “time–space intensification” to attempt to capture
the dynamics of contemporary transitions. This concept suggests that, rather than
disappearing or persisting unchallenged, time and space are intensified in the contemporary
period: the social experience of time and space becomes more explicit and more crucial to
socio-economic actors’ lives, time and space are mobilized more explicitly in individual and
corporate action, and the institutionalization of time and space becomes more politicized.
The concept of time–space intensification seeks to integrate two fundamental insights into
contemporary capitalist organization – the undoubted intensification of capitalist
domination and exploitation together with the protection and re-assertion of industrial
and occupational time and space at a variety of spatial scales (the local, regional,
transnational, and so on).
The article locates existing perspectives on time–space restructuring within the
theoretical lineages of Weber, Marx and Durkheim. It then develops a number of key
concepts from the work of Karl Polanyi – including the notions of fictitious commodities
and the double movement – to integrate some of the crucial insights of these classical
theorists and suggest some of the causes of the dynamics of time–space intensification.
Drawing on these concepts from Polanyi, the article argues that the concept of time–space
intensification can add significantly to our understanding of key features of the
restructuring of the temporal and spatial basis of economic development and work
organization.
The argument is developed using evidence from studies of work organization and
industrial development in the software industry in Ireland, which grew rapidly through the
1990s, particularly around the capital city, Dublin. The Irish software industry has
continued to grow, creating a high-tech region within a network of global flows in and out
of similar regions in the US, UK, Israel, India, Taiwan and elsewhere (Saxenian, 2006).
Given that software is apparently one of the most “virtual” of industries, it represents a
perfect case for analyzing the transformation of time and space.
Understanding time–space restructuring
In the era after World War II a particular set of relations among state, society, and market was
institutionalized internationally, creating a system of relatively stable national economies
organized through an international order of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982). These
economies were tied together through a negotiated regime of multilateral trade but buffered
from the full effects of these international markets by institutions limiting trade and capital
flows. Within these relatively stable industrialized economies, large oligopolistic firms
flourished and promoted bureaucratic organizational hierarchies – reaching down to the level
of the work process through job demarcation and control of work rules (Tilly & Tilly, 1994).
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The national economy and the job within the bureaucratic firm acted as “time–space
containers” (Giddens, 1984), institutionalizing a “spatial fix” for capitalism (Harvey, 1989).
The globalization of the economy has consisted in large part of the weakening and even
destruction of these institutional buffers between national economies and global markets.
States find themselves trying to respond to pressures from local societies and global
markets simultaneously without the breathing room previously offered by controls on
transnational trade, finance, and production. Labor markets have become “flexible”: work
organized through teams and projects, and organizational forms shifting toward
disaggregated network forms. Time and space are being reconfigured in both economies
and work organizations. The challenge is to understand these transformations in a way that
links together spatial structures, projects and practices into a processual, rather than a
deterministic, account of time–space restructuring (Brenner, 2004).
Reich (1991) argues that new information and communication technologies make it
possible and even necessary to reorganize firms into “global webs,” and employees into
global telecommuters. For Reich these webs operate smoothly, destroying constraints of
space and social structure, moving in conjunction with the ever-circling hands of the clocks
on the walls of corporate offices around the globe. These arguments echo those of many
neoclassical economists, where the global workplace is essentially a “virtual place” where
the constraints of space, social organization and local institutional arrangements have been
overcome. The politics of the workplace is replaced by a virtual space of knowledge
sharing and creation, particularly for “knowledge workers” such as software developers.
Space is dis-embedded while control of the labor process is essentially cooperative.
Symbolic analysts live within the “culture of real virtuality” (Castells, 1997) where virtual
ties are as real as actual ones and the boundaries between the “virtual” and the “real” blur.
Reich’s analysis of the process of globalization is compatible with that of Giddens
(1991) who argues that globalization occurs through a process of time–space distanciation –
where time and space are universalized and “lifted out” or made independent of their
immediate contexts. For Reich the global workplace is dis-embedded from its temporal and
spatial contexts and becomes a “pure” space for communication and innovation among
employees. Giddens’s analysis casts light on how this is possible. He argues that
communication across distance depends upon the existence of expert systems, or systems
of knowledge which actors understand and trust (such as the technical language of high-tech
industry), and upon symbolic tokens, or media of communication that can serve as
coordinating mechanisms for long-distance social relations where social cues and monitoring
are absent or opaque (e.g., money).
However, other authors have portrayed a fundamentally different global workplace
where “globalism” – whether it be the ability to create virtual connections or to become
increasingly mobile across the globe – is distributed unequally. In particular capital is
mobile and “virtual” whereas labor is not and therefore capital can dominate the global
workplace (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982; Burawoy, 1985; Shaiken, 1990). Harvey (1989)
argues that time and space have not become distanciated as Giddens claims, but that
corporations have colonized local spaces and time has annihilated space in a process of
time–space compression. Thus, changes in the global workplace put intense pressure on
firms but particularly on workers whose space is increasingly dominated by global
corporations (Harvey, 1989). Harvey portrays a global workplace where globalization
dominates the once autonomous space of the worker and where capital can marshal
globalization in its own interests and reproduce hierarchical relations in the workplace.
Space is dis-embedded but the unequal nature of this dis-embedding provides managers
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with renewed hierarchical control in the workplace. The global informational economy is
no different as corporations assert their control over technological change through shaping
the trajectory of research and its goals, and protecting their “intellectual property rights” and
monopolies of the means of communication (McChesney, Wood, & Foster, 1997). Place
derives its meaning from capitalist locational competition through the ideology of
competitiveness (Cerny, 1995; Le Gales, 2002).
Differ though they may on the degree of capitalist domination over the “space of flows,”
both of these theories of time–space distanciation and compression agree that globalization
is increasingly dis-embedding the globalized economy and workplace from their local
contexts. Other theorists have argued however that the demands for increased flexibility and
specialized learning actually make embedding the global workplace in local spaces even
more critical. Among economists, those who emphasize transaction costs and the social
institutions that make transactions efficient, might also be seen as, at least implicitly,
arguing for the continuing importance of social spaces for interaction and learning,
particularly in the form of “relational contracting” (Williamson, 1985).
Economic geographers have also shown that efficient production and constant innovation
require the construction of shared physical spaces where workers can interact and communicate
on a face-to-face basis and where shared goals and meanings can be created and maintained
(Piore & Sabel, 1984; Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997). Global competitiveness is therefore
dependent on increased spatial embeddedness. The local spaces which can achieve this happy
state of affairs will be able to buffer themselves somewhat from the demands of globalism
because they possess territorially specific and unique institutional and cultural capacities.
Global workplaces are deeply embedded in these territorially and temporally specific contexts
under a process which I call here time–space embedding.
But these accounts of the organization of software business and work in Ireland leave us
with a conundrum. How can we reconcile the insight that the capitalist market produces
pressures towards local fragmentation and loss of autonomy with the emphasis on the
reconstitution of strong local relations within capitalist exchange in studies of time–space
embedding? Mapping the theories more schematically is helpful in posing the dilemma (see
Table 1). There are two critical insights at the heart of this debate. The first is that the
knowledge economy is just as deeply embedded in social relations and social spaces as
previous techno-economic eras. But the implications of this argument are only fully
recognized by theorists of time–space embedding. For the other perspectives, while they
recognize this embeddedness it is ultimately overwhelmed by either rationalization or
capitalist power. The second insight is that the knowledge economy, organized through the
capitalist market, is a structure of exploitation and corrosive competition, not simply equal
exchange. This is central to arguments regarding time–space compression but is not
integrated into the other perspectives. We can then construct a typology of these theories
along these two dimensions – the embedding of the knowledge economy within time–space
and the structure of the knowledge economy as a structure of exploitation or exchange.
Table 1 Theories of time–space restructuring in contemporary capitalism
Knowledge economy is based on ...
Exchange Exploitation and domination
Time–space is ... Disembedded Time–space distanciation Time–space compression
Re-embedded Time–space embedding Time–space intensification
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The dilemma then is that the two most insightful theories, each of which appears to
capture significant elements of the restructuring underway, rely upon quite different basic
notions of the capitalist marketplace – either as a dominating force erasing places except as
competitive locations or as a relatively benign context for competition based on efficiency.
However, we can reconcile both the pressures of the capitalist market and the embedding of
“new industrial spaces” (Scott, 1993) without reducing one to the other. There are, of
course, examples within existing literature of attempts to do precisely this. Manuel Castells
emphasizes the continuing, and even increased, importance of regional economies in a
virtual age, but ultimately the “space of flows” triumphs over the “space of places” for
Castells (1997). There are more significant tendencies with the work of David Harvey, from
within the time–space compression framework, and Michael Piore, whose work on
industrial districts I have located within the time–space embedding framework. Harvey’s
emphasis on the construction of spatial fixities in the accumulation process and on the
ongoing tensions between fixities and accumulation is a vital insight (Brenner, 2004;
Harvey, 1989). However, Harvey’s approach tends to emphasize the ongoing structural
dynamics without providing a framework for understanding the micro- and meso-politics of
time and space, and the space for political choices that emerges in this tension between
accumulation and spatial fixity in capitalism. Michael Piore begins from the fixities of the
industrial districts of the “new economy” but also pays explicit attention to the potentially
corrosive effects of firms and hierarchies on the social ties of local industrial systems and
the public spaces available for social learning (Lester & Piore, 2004; Piore, 1996).
What the efforts of these analysts show us is that it is crucial to further develop our
understanding of the politics of time and space between embedding and compression. The
pressures of the market and the embedding of social relations exist in a dynamic and
symbiotic tension: the market cannot operate without embedded social relations but
unchecked market relations attack those very social relations which sustain them, producing
a defense of social cooperation and solidarity on the part of those integrated into the market.
These struggles ultimately constitute a contested terrain upon which the future of capitalist
restructuring, and the design of new time–space containers, is decided.
There is then a “double movement” between the pressures of time–space compression
and the efforts of workers, firms and states to produce new forms of time–space embedding
as a protection against these pressures. In the struggle between the two sides of this double
movement we find time–space intensification. This occurs in three major ways. First, the
experience of time and space is intensified as it is de-normalized with the cracking of the
taken for granted time–space containers of nation, corporate hierarchy, and job. As Biggart
and Guillen (1999) point out, globalization does not produce homogenization but greater
awareness of difference – time and space become more explicit elements of human
experience. Second, time and space are themselves mobilized as key elements of strategic
action. While all social practices have a spatial and temporal dimension, explicitly spatial
and temporal practices become more critical to social and political action as social actors
attempt to mobilize time and space strategically within global connections and in protection
against the pressures of time–space compression. The “region” becomes a crucial element
of economic development policy while “managing the product development cycle”
becomes central to information technology firms, and so on. Finally, time and space
become highly politicized as struggles take place at multiple levels over the temporal and
spatial organization of contemporary capitalism.
Therefore, the concept of time–space intensification is an attempt to reconcile a recognition
of relations of exploitation and domination that must always operate through, and be
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transformed by, patterns of socio-spatial embedding. These interactions between exploitation
and embedding intensify time with more rapid rates of change in technologies, product
markets and organizational structures; increased turbulence, turnover, and mobility in the
labor market; the importance of deadlines in work organization; and a revolution in
expectations of time and a shortening of time horizons. The intensification of space is not just
a matter of the increased importance of face-to-face interaction or of competition between
places but of the increasing importance of the ability to mobilize space as a resource in social
relations in the face of pressures from the capitalist market. While this mobilization of space
can promote competitiveness in the market, it must also be protected from the pressures of
marketization which will erode the very social relations upon which it is based. Ultimately,
the intensification of space raises, over and over again in concrete social relations, the deep
tension between market and society and opens up political spaces for contesting and
reconfiguring capitalist social relations.
Studying software in the Republic of Ireland
Nowhere has this dis-embedding of existing work organization and economic organization
been clearer than in the “new” informational industries such as software. This article
explores the restructuring of time and space at each of these two levels of one of the newest
of these industries – software – in Ireland, where bureaucratic industrial organization had
only ever developed to a limited extent. This article explores the dominant interpretations of
the restructuring of time and space in informational capitalism through what can only be an
illustrative account of the organization of the Irish software industry. This illustrative
account draws on two main bodies of research, a study of work organization in a US
software company’s Irish subsidiary (see Ó Riain, 2000, 2002) and a study of the political
economy of the growth of the software industry in Ireland (see Ó Riain, 2004).
To investigate work organization I undertook an ethnographic case study in early 1997
of USTech (a false name used to protect the company’s anonymity). The study lasted
3 months and was carried out with the permission and assistance of company management
and with the full knowledge of company employees. USTech is well established in Ireland,
having located there over 15 years ago and becoming one of the early success stories of
Irish industrial policy. For many years it was one of Ireland’s primary computer hardware
production operations, with a reputation for high quality. The hardware manufacturing
operations of USTech Ireland were dismantled with massive layoffs in the early 1990s,
leaving local management scrambling for the operation’s survival and turning to a complete
reliance on the local pool of software skills.
The case study included 12 weeks spent working as a technical writer on a software
development team, 20 interviews carried out with engineers and developers working in the
company, 15 interviews with company managers, and attendance at 15 team, department,
and management meetings (not including team meetings of the team in which I worked).
The five long-term members of the team were employed by USTech but were working on a
contract designing a product for Womble Software, a spin-off from USTech headquarters in
the US. In addition to the team leader, Seamus, there were two permanent (Dan, Conor) and
two long-term contract (Jim, Paul) staff. During this time I participated fully in the work of
the team and wrote a User Guide for our product which was installed on the system as on-
line help for users of the system. I sat in the same cubicle as the rest of the team, attended
team meetings and interacted closely with them on a regular basis on decisions regarding
the User Guide. After an initial period of suspicion of my motives, the team members were
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very welcoming and helpful to me. Indeed the regular flow of contract personnel in and out
of the team meant that I became a relatively well-established team member.
This study of work organization can be further contextualized through another study of the
economic organization of the software industry in Ireland. From 1995 to 2000 approximately
100 interviews were held with managers and executives in indigenous and foreign
companies, individuals working in state agencies, universities, technology and innovation
centers, industry associations and related industry participants and observers. Irish software
grew rapidly in the 1990s and this growth intensified in the late 1990s, with high levels of
foreign investment and indigenous firms’ exports increasing by 92% between 1997 and 2000
(Breznitz, 2002). The industry is divided relatively equally in employment terms between
foreign and Irish owned firms. Concentrated in a particular region with deep global business
and technical ties, the industry is both local and global and cuts across the boundaries of the
national economy. Organizationally, firms within the industry have extensive networks with
other firms, as do software developers with other technical workers in the region.
Time–space dynamics in Irish software
The Irish software industry therefore provides a fascinating opportunity to explore these
various accounts of the transformation of time and space in contemporary advanced
capitalism. This section applies each of the three existing theoretical accounts to the Irish
case in turn, while the following section explores an account of time–space intensification
in software in more detail.
Time–space distanciation: cracking the time–space containers
The time–space container of the national economy has long cracked in the Republic of
Ireland, as the Irish economy was “globalized before globalization.” Economic and
industrial policy in Ireland shifted dramatically between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s,
as protectionist measures were eased for foreign investors, and full integration into the
international economy has been the central plank of Irish economic policy ever since.
Across these decades the national territory was remade into a location for investment.
The physical territory itself was also remade, particularly when the telecommunications
system was upgraded in the early 1980s (Euristix, 1991; Hall, 1993). Trinity College
Dublin was also one of the early “backbone” sites for European access to the Internet which
meant that (free) access to the Internet came relatively early to some within the Irish
industry. In terms both of its technological infrastructure and economic structure, Ireland
had become a highly globalized economy. Both in the dark days of the socio-economic decline
and the black hole economy of the 1980s and the Celtic Tiger boom of the 1990s it appeared
subject to the vagaries of the “space of flows” of international capital (Castells, 1997).
The Irish software industry is characterized by multiple connections to the global economy,
as Reich and Castells suggest. Foreign investment has been the main force shaping Irish
industrial change over the past four decades, but software has also seen the emergence of a
dynamic industry of indigenous firms with extensive global connections. While foreign firms
extend locally through sub-supply and research ties, indigenous firms are involved in
international business and technology alliances (Ó Riain, 2004). Similarly, while Ireland has a
long history of emigration (extending in the 1980s to many technical graduates), the boom of
the 1990s saw extensive return migration and, more recently, very significant immigration
flows from a wide range of EU and non-EU countries. Flows of business and research
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information through transnational personal and institutional linkages have increased
(Saxenian, 2006, p. 358).
Similarly, Womble Software and USTech are interesting examples of the “global web”
corporate structure which Reich argues is becoming the norm. USTech’s links to the global
economy have diversified along with the shift to software services and product development
with a proliferation of customers, partners and internal corporate sponsors replacing their
previous model of reporting directly to a single office in the US. Formed as a spin-off from a
large hierarchical corporation, Womble is partly owned by the four founders, partly by
USTech itself, partly by a major customer, and the rest by a venture capital fund in Silicon
Valley. It has no more than 15 employees of its own. The development team is based in
Ireland and is officially contracted to provide software development services to Womble. The
screens for the program are conceptualized by Ramesh, the Vice-President and lead architect
of Womble in Cincinnati, but all the development work necessary to turn them into computer
graphics is done in a small graphic design house just outside San Francisco. The helpdesk
staff which users reach if they call with a problem is staffed by the trained employees of a
helpdesk contracting company. The technical writers who write the on-screen help for users
are all hired on a contract basis.
In place of more rigid, hierarchical organizational structures we have a shifting web of
connections forged into a relatively fleeting alliance. Ramesh himself subscribed to the
theory of the virtual economy in a “Thank You” E-mail message he sent to the contract
graphic design firm in California:
Our project team was truly an international virtual-team, with up to 8 hours of time–
zone difference among the different team members. We expected you to work at such
a hectic pace, yet, we also demanded extreme flexibility from you in all respects. It is
very rare that anybody of your caliber would be able to excel on both these fronts.
These global connections at the level of industry and firm within Irish software suggest,
therefore, that there has been a shift from a hierarchical form of organization to a network firm
where each team has multiple, different and shifting connections to external partners and
customers. The spread of these connections across the globe and the integration of each team
into dense sets of local and global networks has cracked the time–space container of the firm
and the nation – the expert systems of high-tech and business knowledge and norms and the
symbolic tokens of money, certification, and technological experience have created the
possibility of much deeper and more sustained social ties across these different territories.
The “Irish” software industry is formed out of multiple, shifting global connections.
Time–space compression: subjugating places to the market
However, Irish economic policy to create a “world class” location for mobile investment
involved, not only the creation of a “virtual” economy, but also one that facilitated the need of
foreign capital. When most national economies were still attempting to negotiate with and
control foreign capital, the Irish state turned itself to a relatively unconditional pursuit of such
investors – creating the first free trade zone in the world (at Shannon), providing generous tax
incentives and grants, a transnational-friendly environment, a young and cooperative labor
force and in the 1980s, a world class telecommunications system.
Given the policy emphasis on attracting foreign investment, it is not surprising to find
that industrial policy is profoundly shaped by the perceived and stated needs of the foreign
multinationals, both those located in Ireland and those that might locate there at some point
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in the future. Debates on raising corporate tax rates have centered, for example, on the
impact of raising taxes on foreign investment decisions, and the annual reports of the
industrial development agencies place a central emphasis on the factors shaping Ireland’s
ability to attract foreign investment.
The transformations that followed this political emphasis were far reaching. Irish
political and economic institutions were radically reshaped through the 1970s, in large part
in pursuit of foreign investment. The structure of state finances has been transformed to
greatly reduce taxes on capital and profits in an effort to attract foreign investment, leaving
the state heavily reliant on revenues from personal income taxes. The percentage of
government revenues from taxes on capital and corporations declined from 2.3% of GDP in
1965 to 1.2% in 1985, while the taxation burden on personal income increased enormously
from 4.3% of GDP in 1965 to 11.4% in 1985 (OECD, 1997). The education system has
been transformed, largely through the creation of a large sector of the third-level education
system, which is oriented heavily towards business and technology, and which has in the
process transformed the social structure. Furthermore, the ideology of “competitiveness”
has been institutionalized as a national policy priority with the establishing of the National
Competitiveness Council which monitors almost any aspect of social and economic life for
its implications for firm competitiveness. The focus of the competitiveness agenda has been
the reduction of costs, and the policy mechanism of choice is increased market competition –
typically reflected in calls for wage restraint and reduced public spending. Official policy has
been in fact to create the national economy as a place that can compete within the global
market, and all other policy considerations are to be consistent with this over-riding priority
given to locational competitiveness. The “virtual” economy had a capitalist content.
These pressures are also evident in the area of work organization. USTech has its roots in
an era where, even in rapidly shifting technology markets, large oligopolistic firms were
able to maintain a degree of stability in their environment that enabled them to build stable
organizational hierarchies. Even in USTech Ireland, the company had maintained a
reputation for job security, good pay, high quality and training (all the while remaining non-
union). But, even if pay and conditions remained good, USTech in the 1990s in Ireland was
a fundamentally different firm.
Corporate organization has been transformed with the rise of “markets within
hierarchies” as teams now deal directly with their internal and external customers. Getting
time to go on training courses or finding funds to pay for new technologies, training, and
other infrastructural resources is a common complaint for workers and managers alike. As
the USTech Managing Director puts it: “I don’t have a budget, it’s a customer style
relationship within the company and with clients. This has a big impact in that we only
provide services that we get paid for. People don’t have jobs, they have assignments; these
can change every couple of months. There are complaints from some areas, no one is sure
who they’re working for – I’m saying ‘well try and get used to it.’ We need to be more able
to move people around – we need the flexibility, it’s very different from mainframes where
you get your production figures at the beginning of the year. Now we have to keep the
services very close to demand.”
These pressures translate into intense pressures upon workers, as work hours lengthen in
the face of looming deadlines:
Conor: We’re all tired, we’ve been at it for two months really. It’s a lot of pressure.
Something every day. There’s no time to take a day and research something. We need
a week to go over some of the bigger issues, have some meetings, go over things, you
know. There’s some dodgy code in there too.
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Among the team members, proposed legislation limiting working hours is discussed
ironically:
Séamus: I wonder does Ramesh know about the European Social Charter limiting the
working week? 43 hours per week or something.
Conor: Great!
Jim: It’s 48
Conor: F#*!, that long
Jim: Yeah, 48 for each company, 48 for Womble and 48 for USTech!
Such hours and constant pressure take their toll – the week after the deadline I bumped into
Paul on our way in to work:
Paul: I was feeling crap lately ’cause I’ve been under a lot of pressure and everything.
But now I feel great after having that day off.
As the classic institutions of national economy, hierarchical firm, and demarcated job
can no longer contain time and space, the pressures of locational competitiveness in a
global market move ever more quickly between product market, regional economy, firm,
team, workers, and families. As an international subsidiary, the pressures from the market
are all the more intense as the organizational distance – from whatever investment is
available at the center – is further, and the specter of locational competitiveness looms
large. This reaches even to the team level, where each new project brings the possibility of
work being relocated elsewhere. Unions are almost non-existent in the US-owned high-tech
companies in Ireland – as the Managing Director points out: “10 years ago USTech in CA
was saying ‘we are non-union or get your ass out of there.’” As Harvey argues, there are
indeed enormous pressures from capitalist markets to compress time and space. The global
economy is not simply virtual but also a carrier of the pressures of capitalism.
Time–space embedding: gluing together new time–space containers
Has space simply been annihilated by the pressures of time, therefore? The transformation
of space and place is more complex than the story of time–space compression allows
(Massey, 1994). Even within these global pressures towards the “hollowing out” of local
space in the Irish economy, during the Celtic Tiger years significant transformations
occurred in the capabilities of the Irish economy. Spending on research and development
increased, new forms of team production were relatively widely adopted, the labor force
became increasingly professionalized and productivity improved. Irish owned firms grew
and a number became important international firms as exporters and as overseas investors
in their own right (Ó Riain, 2004). Most significant were changes in the labor market; as
employment rose dramatically, female labor participation increased, unemployment
declined, and mass emigration was reversed. As it turns out, these transformations were
rooted in new sets of social institutions and alliances between groups within the state and
society – not simply in individual entrepreneurial action supported by freewheeling markets
for money, labor and technology. If the Celtic Tiger was a mirage, it was also a surprisingly
concrete set of changes in economic life – new social and organizational capacities for
knowledge creation emerged.
In the mid-1980s, a small software industry had emerged based on ties to foreign firms
and fragile local technical communities, formed by the technical graduates and
sophisticated users of computing technology who were starting to emerge. Despite a
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massive brain drain, a number of those who stayed started their own companies, combining
with a trickle of people from the foreign owned sector and other organizations to form the
basis of a fragile set of overlapping technical communities in the 1980s. The industry
culture was relatively open in the early years and something of a technical community,
linked to international trends, developed – as one developer put it: “There was a lot of
swapping of ideas going on from about the mid-1980s on. Anything real that goes on is
informal.”
In addition, a set of networks, centers, forums, and groups provides an associational
infrastructure for information-sharing, cooperation, and innovation in Irish software. This
network of associations underpins many of the “relational assets” within the industry
(Storper, 1997). A software developer’s comments reveal the way that informal
associational networks can have an important impact even when not explicitly recognized
by the actors involved: “Those industry groups are really just talking shop, they don’t have
any real impact. But in fairness I suppose I’m being a bit bilious towards them. I do meet a
lot of people there. The informal human networks are more important than the formal
industry or professional association stuff. Then I’ll ring up Michael and say ‘what was that
tool you were talking about to debug program X? And where would I get it?’ So it’s good
that way. There’s a lot that goes on among the people that go there” (Developer/Manager,
US TNC doing development in Ireland).
These “powers of association” are also relevant within the workplace itself. The very
“virtual teams” that exist in Womble software are rooted in the social relations of workers
who are usually located in close proximity to one another, as this allows the team to handle
the complex interdependencies between team members through easy and constant
communication, and allows them to build a coherent collective identity that becomes the
basis of cooperation within the team.
The sheer volumes of information and the dependence of each member of the team on
the design decisions of the others make the easy interaction of the team members critical.
As Jim at USTech worked on the user interface screens he would intermittently call over to
Paul two desks away “what did you call the course number variable, Paul, I can’t find it,”
“are you working on the database at the moment, it’s a bit slow,” “who’s doing the security
screens.” The questions and answers are discussed on the way to and back from breakfast
and lunch.
By contrast, information flows to the United States can be patchy and tend to be limited
to broad strategic decisions. A developer in Silicon Valley would have great difficulty in
developing this product along with the team around me. Indeed my own easy ability to ask
the developers around me for information 15 times a day contrasts with the difficulties I
have sharing information with Jane in Silicon Valley, leaving me idle for mornings or
afternoons as I wait to be able to call her in the United States to clear up some minor
misunderstandings. Where such transnational “virtual” relationships work they are
constantly supplemented by travel to meet the team(s) in the other country; e.g., Ramesh
was a regular visitor to the USTech Ireland office. This clearly also affected how much
employees could learn from their colleagues. The experience of working with the more
experienced and skilled developers taught others the skills and tricks which turn a computer
science graduate into an effective and innovative programmer.
Located in a city which is attractive to the young people who dominate the software
industry, USTech also benefits from access to a large pool of local skilled labor as well as
from the connections of the Womble team members to the broader “culture of innovation”
within the region. Their high mobility careers are also sustained through social ties to others
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in the industry who can provide the team members with information on job opportunities
and can provide formal or informal recommendations to employers regarding the team
members’ competence. Ease of communication and cooperation ensures that spaces defined
by face-to-face interaction remain a critical component of the global workplace, even as
virtual spaces proliferate.
Time–space intensification
Given the evidence that partially supports each of these perspectives, we must therefore
return to our conundrum – how to reconcile the pressures of capitalist globalization on
particular places with the reassertion of place-based social relations within capitalist
innovation itself?
Experiencing time and space
It should be clear from the above that time and space loom large in the experience of
workers, managers and policy makers in the Irish software industry. Where the nation state
had been institutionalized as a time–space container, time and space were normalized as
aspects of everyday life and political economic conditions. In the limited spatial and
temporal cases of the advanced capitalist countries during the postwar “Golden Age” of
growth, time and space had receded as elements of these everyday experiences. However,
the sources of the new growth within these countries and the new emerging informational
economies such as Ireland bring issues of time and space to the fore. Connections to
partners, suppliers, customers, and competitors across time zones and thousands of miles
were a part of everyday life at USTech and in most firms in the Irish industry. But the
experience of time and space had a sharper edge than that.
Managers and policy elites are firmly aware of the shortening of product cycles and the
speed of technological and business change. Indeed, many of the mangers and policy makers
I interviewed had received MBAs or written theses on precisely these topics, in an attempt to
make sense of the new conditions they faced. But the product cycle was important to workers
also. As one project ends, the next phase will involve the shift to a Java platform (then the
“hot” technology). As the teammoves to a new temporal technical phase in the development,
this opens a spatial “window of locational opportunity” for Womble Software and the
danger that development work could move back to the US or elsewhere. One team meeting
discussing the move to Java produced the following exchange:
Michael (Business Manager): We had to get a Java person in Ireland. Ramesh had
someone in the US, but we couldn’t let that happen, we couldn’t let it go there.
Paul: Yeah, you don’t want to let the development stuff leak back to the US. If it starts
it’ll all end up back there eventually.
The Irish team scrambles to gather together Java skills and to give Ramesh the impression
that we have more skills than we do.
Awareness of spatial and social difference was also enhanced by globalization (Biggart
& Guillen, 1999). One of the Womble Software managers took us out for a meal when she
was visiting from the US. Halfway through the evening I commented to Pat, a contractor,
“She seems okay, decent enough,” to which Pat replied, “Well, when you come to discover
the jungle you have to play with the natives.” Workers are also highly aware of competition
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from elsewhere in the world; three members of a different team discuss their Indian boss in
the US with Conor and me:
Pat: We have one too – Ranjit
Conor: Ranjit that, sounds like something out of Aladdin
Peter: (Says something imitating Ramesh’s accent). That’s racist that is (i.e.,
criticizing himself, very serious about it).
Bob: Yeah, that’s an “ism,” that is. That’s racism.
Pat: They’re (Indian software developers) probably over there saying “those bloody
Micks.”
Aidan: Yeah, saying “drinking pints of Guinness over their computers.”
Social and spatial “difference” on a global scale is an everyday part of these software
developers’ milieu, although it is negotiated within a strong homogenous local culture;
awareness of time and space is intensified.
Mobilizing time and space
Time and space do not simply enter into everyday experience, however. They are mobilized
by a variety of socio-economic actors in the global informational workplaces and industries.
The demands of global competitiveness are mobilized regularly by managers and policy
makers alike, as discussed above. In the workplace, the demands of time are also central. In
the work process itself, the mechanism for controlling the software development team is the
project deadline. Managerial control over the labor process has shifted from an emphasis on
the direct authority of management over work tasks (an authority that in the case of
knowledge workers has been steadily undermined) to an increased effort to dominate the
workplace through the regulation of time. Through the use of project deadlines, managers
set the parameters for the team’s efforts.
As it is impossible for the final design specifications to provide solutions to every issue
faced by the team, and the actual work done by the team is difficult for management to
supervise directly, the deadline becomes the focus of management and team efforts. “Dowhat
needs to be done to get this specification working by the deadline” is the broad task of the
team. The deadline is the mechanism by which management brings the intensification of time
into the heart of the team. It is also an attractive mechanism of control since direct authority
over the work process is undermined by the expertise of the employees and the need for rapid
communication and cooperation. In contrast time can be regulated through the use of the
deadline with only a limited local managerial presence and with relatively little ongoing
exercise of managerial authority. The ability of the firm to enforce time pressures through
deadlines is shored up through appeals to the spatial threats of global competition.
Workers respond, however –mobilizing as part of a double movement in the face of efforts
to colonize their time, space, and knowledge. They attempt to mobilize around time and to
create protections. There are many complaints about deadlines and long hours. Attempts to
protect themselves from these pressures largely take the form of strategies to redefine the limits
and content of these pressures, rather than outright resistance to the deadlines themselves.
At times, this does take the form of explicitly managing demands on time. Weeks before
the project deadline, Conor had told me:
I’ve a feeling this is the calm before the storm. My attitude when it’s calm is get out of
here at 4 or 5 ‘cause when it gets busy... you have to draw the line yourself as far as
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hours go, you have to say once in a while, “Sorry I have something on tonight, I can’t
stay.” You have to keep your standard hours around 39/40. If you let your standard
hours go up to 45 then they’ll still come to you and ask you to do a few extra hours
that evening, they won’t think about that extra 6 hours you’re doing as part of your
standard. It’s up to yourself to draw the line.
While the deadline itself took on a sacred and unmovable character, the definition of what
counted as “getting finished” before the deadline was a moveable and contested feast. Some
issues were left for other, subsequent deadlines. At other times, workers strategized to avoid
any extra tasks being given to the team before the deadline. On one occasion Ramesh sent
an E-mail about a “work around” the team would have to do around a problem in the
database they were using. Not realizing that Dan had been working on this issue for a while
now, he set aside a day the week before the release for Dan to work on it.
Jim: Dan will have that done today.
Sean: So what about the day Ramesh is setting aside for it next week?
Jim: Oh God, I’m not going to tell him we already have a solution. He’s already
expecting it to slip a bit so if we get it in on time he’ll be really happy. I think we’re a
little bit ahead of schedule but he thinks we’re a bit behind so that suits us.
Space became an asset in handling the politics of time. Having a manager on the other side
of the world allows the team, including the team leader, to screen information from Ramesh
in order to let the team balance the technical and time demands to their own satisfaction.
Having encountered a particularly thorny problem, the team finally found a solution:
Jim: So we’re going to do that then. Ramesh never needs to know about it. So we can
have it set up the way we want it and he’ll have it the way he wants too.
Paul: So we’re going to do it the sneaky bastard way
Séamus: I like the sneaky bastard way!
Paul: And Ramesh never needs to know
Séamus: No, no. Well done gentlemen!
Jim: Just don’t say anything about this on Monday when Ramesh is here!
In general, team members were careful to protect themselves from undue interference from
HQ in the US and left the negotiation of deadlines and larger technical issues to Séamus,
the team leader. As Conor advised me when I had sent an E-mail to Ramesh about a
problem in the “help” screens:
Conor: Be careful what you send to Ramesh. Cc it to Séamus or better yet send it to
Séamus first, let him decide. That’s what I do. You have to look after your own behind
first you know. I try to get involved as little as possible with Silicon Valley, I give it to
Séamus. That way I have a buffer between me and the US.
But workers relied on local spaces beyond the firm as well. The team members maintained
contact with their own networks within the industry – at times contacting friends for
technical advice and regularly sending bad jokes around email lists of friends. The
emergence of “the region” as a critical space for innovation also facilitates mobility as
employees find it relatively easy to “job-hop” within the region, and others migrate to the
region, attracted by the concentration of high-technology jobs (Saxenian, 1994).
The short-term contract staff members who flitted in and out of the team put a significant
amount of work into maintaining their networks, constantly talking on their mobile phones
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about technology, upcoming jobs, and people in the industry. On one occasion, an applicant
for a contract position within the team was rejected because one of the team members had
worked with him before and had not been impressed.
The region has been mobilized by the state also to support firms. Public investment in
education, concentrated for a time on the supply of scientific and technical graduates,
played an enormous part in sustaining firms such as USTech. Furthermore, since the 1980s,
a network of semi-public institutions had emerged–funded and sponsored by the Irish state
and the EU and often linked to the universities–that supported innovation and research.
Innovation centers, programs in advanced technology, technology centers, and other
institutions were an important collective set of supports for individual technologists and
business people (Ó Riain, 2004). These state-supported institutions helped to build inter-
firm networks, while the middle classes of the technical communities benefited handsomely
from the Irish two-tier welfare state (Ó Riain & O’Connell, 2000). The region and the state
picked up at least some of the slack that had been created by the retreat of the institutions of
the firm.
Politicizing time and space
Despite these strategies for self-protection, explicit collective or political action was rare –
especially in the workplace. The step between protection and resistance is not an automatic
one but the intensification of time and space does nevertheless open up time and space for
political discussion in a way that had not happened during the period time and space had
been embedded within national institutional forms.
We have already seen numerous ways in which the ideologies and practices of
competitiveness are used to mobilize time and space in the service of corporate interests.
The project of attracting foreign investment resulted, not in the depoliticization of space and
territory, but in the hyper-politicization of the national territory as the territory itself became
an object of political (and particularly state) action. Reshaping the nation into location
through incentives, telecommunications, and regional- and land-use policy, has been a
major strategy in the pursuit of mobile investment, a strategy which has drawn the state
ever more deeply into the management of space (Brenner, 1998).
But is there a politics that contests these corporate political projects of time and space?
At times, workplace dissatisfactions extended into banter about collective action among the
USTech employees. When new changes to the computer graphics for the screens arrived
1 week before the deadline the team was furious:
Conor: I’m going on strike.
Sean: That’ll make history, the first strike in the software industry.
(Dan laughs ironically)
Conor: You know what last minute changes mean, it means you work your arse off.
Dan: If it’s something we’ve agreed already I’ll work my ass off. But if it’s last
minute changes I won’t. It has to be reasonable, or else it’s “see you later.”
While collective action is dismissed out of hand, the workers hold on to a (poorly
articulated) notion of something that is “reasonable,” a nascent idea of fairness.
There are also significant local accountabilities among team members, which are much
more easily sustained in face-to-face interactions than in “virtual” communications. This
can happen even in the most apparently “flat” and non-hierarchical of organizations. I was
caught in a bind during a conference call when Ramesh asked me, an untrained technical
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writer with a long and largely irrelevant training in sociology, “Seán, are you happy with
the proposal to put the toolbar in the help box?” While I was being formally asked to
participate in a design decision, the social structure of this global organization made me
think first, not of the implications of my decision for the system itself, but of my loyalties to
the developers around me who would be furious at the potential extra work generated by
this proposal. Even the periodical visits of Ramesh to Ireland did not solve the problems of
miscommunication and alienation felt by the Irish team. As Michael, the business manager
of the group, said, “having a remote manager has made getting a process of communication
in place a lot more difficult.” Problems which would require solution in a face-to-face
context can be swept under the carpet or become a figure of fun in a context where
communication is by phone and the Internet.
Other local accountabilities to family and non-work lives surface occasionally, as in a
conversation before Ramesh arrives in Ireland to take us to a promised celebration dinner:
Jim: Maybe we’ll all meet up. I hope he doesn’t meet my wife. She has it in for him.
Séamus: Herself and Linda should get together so. They have a lot in common
actually – they’re both vegetarians too.
Sean: Except when it comes to Ramesh! (Laughter)
Jim: I see you’ve met my wife!
Despite these complaints and competing logics of social organization, an explicit politics of
worker rights is absent. As Aileen O’Carroll (2005) notes in her ethnographic study of
work hours among Irish software developers, workers are able to restrict hours in many
cases through shaping and imposing local norms but there is no legitimate industry-wide set
of norms around the right to limit hours or the demands of the workplace. While there are
countervailing pressures, these new workplace institutions have created pressures for longer
hours, uncertainty and the boundaries of working life. These are issues that lead these
workers directly to a concern with broader issues of social reproduction – the social
investments and institutions that support any labor force, and particularly the skilled
workers of a knowledge economy. Where large firms have reduced their commitments to
individual workers, this creates enormous pressures on workers but also opportunities for
creative political movements. There are new issues for workers in knowledge workplaces
and new bases for connecting those workplace concerns to broader community, regional,
and national political struggles around social investment and welfare supports.
What is particularly striking in the Irish case is that neither time–space compression nor
time–space embedding can dominate alone. Ultimately the local social relations need to be
protected from the market; when Ireland saw “globalization without localization” in the
1980s – a more pure form of both time–space distanciation and compression – it proved
unable to sustain capitalist development (Mjoset, 1992). The local institutions of innovation
are designed to serve capitalist purposes but at the same time, if they are to be effective,
they must protect the social and public bases of the high-tech region and the system of
innovation if they are not to be eroded and local space to be “hollowed out” (Lundvall,
Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002). This extends further to the subsidies provided to the
middle class, including the high-tech workforce, by the “two-tier” Irish welfare state.
Ultimately, the embedding of the technical–professional firms and workers of the Irish
software industry in social and political institutions opens us a vast range of issues of
investment, social reproduction, and equity. Most clearly, it opens up a space of negotiation
and struggle over supports for business, but this is the beginning of a debate about re-
embedding the market as it can be constructed to lead out to these broader issues. Whether
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this debate takes place depends on political mobilization; time–space intensification does
not produce a linear political logic but a new terrain of contestation.
Interpreting time–space intensification through Polanyi
If time–space intensification is a central dynamic in global informational capitalism, how
are we to understand its sociological causes and conditions? What are the processes that set
these dynamics in train? To examine these questions, we must turn briefly to the theoretical
foundations of each of the concepts of time–space restructuring that we have discussed.
Each of the three main concepts in the current literature can be linked (see Table 2) to a
specific tradition within the “trinity” of sociological theory – Weber, Marx, and Durkheim.
Reich and Giddens’s analyses of time–space distanciation are firmly within the Weberian
tradition, whereby a cultural logic of rationalization erodes difference, facilitating
impersonal administration, exchange, and control but also creating new “iron cages”
within which we work. The driving force of temporal and spatial change is, however,
rationalization of beliefs and communication, and the outcome is an increasingly globally
encompassing world of standardized meanings and symbols.
Harvey’s concept of time–space compression is explicitly located within the Marxist
tradition, whereby the once autonomous local space of the worker is increasingly dominated
by global corporations and the ever more rapid pace of economic life under capitalism. Time
annihilates space, melting away “solid” local places into the “air” of the global economy
(Berman, 1982). While Harvey makes important contributions to the understanding of
spatial restructuring and the emergence of new “spatial fixes” for capitalism (Brenner,
2004), his overarching concept emphasizes the domination of space by capitalism.
I have taken most liberties with the definition of the concept of time–space embedding.
Ultimately, this perspective is Durkheimian, as an increased division of labor creates deeper
and more complex forms of social integration – although, as for Durkheim, social capital
and social institutions are required to play a role in combating tendencies towards
fragmentation and individualization. Globalization and informationalism have hastened this
process by intensifying the competitive pressures which demand cooperation, by deepening
the division of labor and by placing communication around complex and non-standard tasks
at the core of economic life. For Durkheim, and for the theorists of “industrial districts,” the
increasingly complex division of labor produces new forms of solidarity and interdependence.
This article has emphasized the contributions of the Marxist and Durkheimian concepts
of compression and embedding and has argued that they are best used in dynamic
combination. A promising vehicle for such a synthesis is the work of Karl Polanyi, perhaps
the primary source for the sociological analysis of markets. While Marx, Weber, and others
Table 2 Theoretical lineages of concepts of time–space restructuring
Knowledge economy is based on ...
Exchange Exploitation and domination
Time–space is ... Disembedded Time–space distanciation Time–space compression
WEBER MARX
Re-embedded Time–space embedding Time–space intensification
DURKHEIM POLANYI
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incorporate markets into their analyses of capitalism and industrialism, Polanyi makes the
analysis of the social foundations of market economies, and the threat that unregulated
markets pose to “society,” central to his explanation of the great political and social
transformations if the twentieth century (Block, 2003; Piore, 1996).
Polanyi argues that when markets come to dominate society, they undermine themselves.
The problem is not with markets themselves, which have existed throughout history, but
with the emerging dominance of an unregulated market in the nineteenth century – a new
historical moment. Markets in goods that are produced for sale (cars, toys etc.) are
relatively inconsequential for Polanyi’s analysis. What concerns Polanyi is the extension of
markets to land, money and – particularly – labor. Polanyi argues that labor is nothing other
than the human beings of which society consists and to include it in the market mechanism
is to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market. Labor is a
fictitious commodity: “Labour is only another name for a human activity which goes with
life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can
that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized” Polanyi (1944[2001]).
Post-industrial economies reach ever deeper into the constituent elements of labor,
interaction, and social relations. Crucially, we have seen the increasing commercialization
of both knowledge (Castells, 1997) and emotion (Hochschild, 1983). This suggests that we
can add knowledge to Polanyi’s list of fictitious commodities, as the production of
knowledge and the activities of learning and innovation are intrinsic aspects of social
action. The knowledge economy is driven by a deep tension between the social relations
necessary to generate knowledge (and knowledge as a constituent element of social
relations) and the reach of markets into social relations to extract that knowledge, codify it,
and commercialize it.
The commodity fiction does serve to help organize actual markets for labor – and now for
knowledge. However, neither labor nor knowledge can be marketized unproblematically –
fictitious commodities being deeply unstable. Marketized labor seeks to protect itself from
the depredations of the commodification of human activity itself. The nineteenth century saw
a “double movement” of marketization followed by a rash of efforts from all sections of
society, seeking to protect themselves from the market. Polanyi’s analysis of the “double
movement” of the rise of market society and the response of social protection has gained
increasing attention in recent years, as a new era of global “market society” emerges. The
“double movement” is easily recognized in the project of neo-liberal globalization and the
social protections erected through social movements and even some state policies. However,
the framework can also provide us with a deeper understanding of the knowledge economy.
There is a fundamental tension within the knowledge economy between the marketization of
knowledge and the social foundations of its production (Jessop, 2000). But the marketization
of knowledge itself faces the challenge of transforming these social practices of knowledge
and knowing into defined units of intellectual property. The knowledge economy prompts its
own double movement where the marketization of knowledge attacks the social foundations
of its production, setting in train a wide range of attempts to protect those foundations.
There is a deep tension within the knowledge economy between the conditions under
which knowledge is exploited and the socio-spatial embedding of the social relations of
production – the very dimensions outlined in Tables 1 and 2. Polanyi points to both the
intimate relationship and intrinsic tension between the exploitative dimension emphasized
by Marxists and the social embedding emphasized by Durkheimians. For Polanyi, neither
can ever overwhelm the other, and the time–space compression of David Harvey is always
met with a myriad of projects of time–space embedding. While they cannot be addressed
Theor Soc
fully here, there are important intellectual connections between Polanyi and both Durkheim
and Marx. Polanyi’s relationship to Marxism is a checkered one (Block, 2003), but it is
clear that there are important points of connection between Polanyi’s explanation of the
emergence of “social protection” in the face of market society, and the critique of capitalism
and the emphasis on civil society in Gramsci and Western Marxism (Burawoy, 2003).
Polanyi’s own concept of society – as based on an intrinsic human interdependence Polanyi
(1944[2001]) and on reciprocity in social relations (Polanyi, 1977) – owes a great deal to a
Durkheimian anthropology of “the gift.” Polanyi offers, through his analysis of the
dynamics of the double movement, a way to bridge what Lockwood (1990) calls Marx’s
analysis of schism and Durkheim’s emphasis on solidarity.
The concept of time–space intensification suggests that at particular moments of
increased struggle between compression and embedding, time and space are intensified –
they become more crucial instruments of labor control, they are mobilized as elements of
state economic development strategies, they are experienced as elements of the lived reality
of socio-economic life, and they ultimately open up the possibility of new and intensified
political struggles that will lead to a re-embedding of time and space in a subsequent
historical period.
Conclusion
The time–space distanciation perspective directs our attention to how every global
workplace is shot through with connections to many different places across the world.
However, the social world portrayed in such a perspective is one where shared under-
standings are achieved through universal media of exchange and shared information –
questions of power, distribution, and negotiation and contestation are difficult to analyze
within this framework. Although the perspective rightly emphasizes the fatal cracks in the
time–space containers of nation, firm, and job, it tells us little about the social relations within
the “space of flows” beyond its basic technological and interactional conditions.
The time–space compression framework addresses some of these problems by showing
the pressures placed upon workers in specific global workplaces by the shortening of time
in the global economy. However, this perspective sees only domination and cannot theorize
the process of contestation in the global workplace nor how certain workers can make
significant gains within that workplace. Furthermore, these authors greatly exaggerate the
rumors of the death of space and place, as the theorists of what I have called time–space
embedding demonstrate. These theorists show how the demands of globalization in fact
strengthen the power of place so that specific places emerge to occupy specific nodes in the
global workplace. However, these theorists have not been as successful in their efforts to
explain how the power of place intersects with these places’ global connections nor have
they fully addressed how the pressures of globalization manifest themselves in the
contestations within these new workplaces.
In the struggle between the symbiotic, but opposing, pressures of time–space
compression and the protective efforts of time–space embedding we find time–space
intensification. The experience of time and space are intensified as they are de-normalized
with the cracking of the taken for granted time–space containers of nation, corporate
hierarchy, and job. Time and space are themselves mobilized as key elements of strategic
action. While all social practices have a spatial and temporal dimension, explicitly spatial and
temporal practices become more critical to social and political action as social actors attempt
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to mobilize time and space in protection against the pressures of time–space compression.
Finally, time and space become highly politicized as struggles take place at multiple levels
over the temporal and spatial organization of contemporary capitalism. In the Polanyian
“double movement” between time–space compression and embedding and between market
and society, we find time–space intensification and new possibilities of politics.
E.P. Thompson famously related a new linear and standardized time–discipline to the
First Industrial Divide. It may be that Polanyi offers a way into understanding a new time–
discipline linked to the Second Industrial Divide. This is a time discipline that is cyclical
rather than linear as it is linked to ever more rapid cycles of investment, product
development, and project deadlines. It is also “recombinant,” as the cracking of the time–
space containers of the first industrial divide open a wide variety of temporal and spatial
practices and new time–space projects, even within a context of increased power of capital.
Whether this can be sustained or not, Polanyi’s framework sits well with contemporary
analyses of social change that emphasize such cyclical structural processes – containing
particular moments of crisis, contingency, and political opportunity – such as the world
systems theory of Arrighi and Silver (2001) and the historical analysis of historical techno-
economic cycles (Freeman & Louca, 2002; Perez, 2002). These approaches offer a more
fruitful road than either linear, determinist accounts of social change or the voluntarism of
accounts based in the opposing camps of methodological individualism and postmodern-
ism. As existing forms of time–space embedding are eroded by marketization, we can
expect a wide variety of attempts to emerge to create new social spaces where buffers can
be erected to protect social relations from the turbulence and corrosion of markets; we
might therefore expect time–space intensification to be particularly characteristic of periods
of dis- and re-embedding of economic life. To the extent that information technologies
increase the speed and distance at which capitalism operates, then it should also be
characteristic of informational capitalism.
In fact, we can see Polanyi’s double movement at work across multiple time scales and
spatial levels – in micro-interactions in the workplace, in meso-institutional spaces, and in
the macro-historical transformations that Polanyi himself emphasizes. As marketization
reaches into each scale at which informational capitalism is produced, the character of
knowledge as a fictitious commodity produces a corresponding range of strategies of social
protection. For some, these protections take the form of shielding information from remote
managers to make deadlines more manageable, while for others the political issues of social
reproduction loom ever larger and they are led to the politicization of time and space.
Extending Polanyi’s analysis of fictitious commodities – to recognize knowledge as a
fictitious commodity – and of the double movement – to recognize the multiple levels at
which the double movement can operate – enables us to understand why time-space
intensification is a central feature of global informational capitalism. The intensification of
time and space is a matter of the de-normalization of existing patterns of organizing time
and space and their increasing significance in everyday life, in strategic mobilization and in
politics. Time and space become increasingly matters of strategy and politics for a period of
struggle before they become re-embedded. The intensification of time and space is both a
period of increased struggle over time–space and a moment of opportunity to re-embed
time–space in new forms of social relations.
Polanyi does not explain, nor even suggest any comprehensive explanation of, how these
myriad social protectionist responses interact to form the different fascist or social
democratic responses to marketization that he documents. However, his concepts of
fictitious commodities and the double movement, and the related concept developed here of
Theor Soc
time–space intensification, do suggest that the politics of time and space are more critical
and more open than other theories have recognized.
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